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A WORLD OF DISTRUST 
Timothy M. Mulvaney* 
In District of Columbia v. Wesby, the Supreme Court determined 
that a prudent officer had probable cause to arrest attendees at a festive 
house party for criminal trespass without a warrant. While reactions from 
scholars of criminal law have begun to emerge, this Piece is the first to 
conceive of the decision through the lens of property theory. In this regard, 
the Piece offers two principal claims. First, on interpretive grounds, it 
contends that, in constitutionalizing these arrests based on evidence 
seemingly unrelated to whether the party attendees knew or should have 
known they were trespassing, Wesby generated a de facto reallocation of 
property interests. Specifically, the decision abolished (a) the right held by 
the general public to access without fear of arrest those properties to which 
they reasonably believe they are welcome and (b) the correlative duty of 
titleholders to respect reasonably mistaken access until the mistake is 
revealed. Second, on normative grounds, it questions the justificatory 
nature of this shift from an allocation that vindicates the trust one person 
has placed in another to an allocation that allows someone else to violate 
that trust. The Piece concludes that perceiving Wesby as a dispute over 
property interests will not only deepen the developing assessments of the 
decision by scholars of criminal law but more broadly prompt reflection 
on matters across the property spectrum as to the oft-concealed 
implications that allocative choices regarding property interests bring to 
bear on our ability to trust one another in the marketplace and in myriad 
social settings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In response to a neighbor’s noise complaint, six police officers arrived 
at a house party in our nation’s capital.1 Some of the twenty-one attendees 
asserted that a woman whom they believed to be a tenant had invited them, 
while others said they were invited by someone else.2 The host admitted to 
the police that she had extended the invitations and encouraged others to 
do the same.3 She also confessed, however, that while she had been negoti-
ating with the titleholder, the two had—allegedly unbeknownst to the 
attendees—not yet finalized a lease.4 Upon learning that the host was not 
actually a tenant and that the titleholder had not authorized the party, the 
police immediately arrested the attendees for criminal trespass and 
transported them to a local police station.5 
In District of Columbia v. Wesby, the Supreme Court considered whether 
a reasonably prudent officer in these circumstances had probable cause to 
make such warrantless arrests.6 In holding that such an officer could have 
inferred that the attendees knew or should have known that they were 
trespassing, the Court pointed only to the following categories of evidence: 
the condition of the interior of the house; the attendees’ conduct at the 
party, which was legal if, to some, immoral; the attendees’ reactions to the 
officers; and the second-hand nature of some of the party invitations.7 
Reactions to the decision from criminal law and procedure scholars—
some consisting of praise and others critique—are beginning to emerge.8 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 138 S. 
Ct. 577 (2018). 
 2. Id. at 17. 
 3. Id. at 18. 
 4. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 816 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Pillard, J. & 
Edwards, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he owner told the officers 
he had not yet rented the house to [the host].”). 
 5. Wesby, 765 F.3d at 18. Under District of Columbia law, the crime of unlawful entry 
on property carries with it a possible jail sentence of up to 180 days and a fine of up to 
$1,000. D.C. Code § 22-3302 (2020). 
 6. See 138 S. Ct. at 585–89. 
 7. See id. at 586–87. 
 8. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Albrecht, Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity 
“From Below”, 53 Val. U. L. Rev. 47, 59 (2018) (suggesting that Wesby converts the “probable 
cause” standard to an “arguable probable cause” standard, thereby “further unmoor[ing]” 
the doctrine of qualified immunity “from its original purpose of granting immunity only 
in qualified circumstances” (emphasis omitted)); Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time 
to Change the Message, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1887, 1928 n.262 (2018) (contending that 
Wesby contributes to a line of qualified immunity jurisprudence that effectively eliminates 
myriad civil rights claims); Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional 
Structure, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 1405, 1414 & n.57 (2019) (citing Wesby as one of the Supreme 
Court’s cases that offers questionably broad deference to the police under the doctrine of 
qualified immunity); Anthony J. Ghiotto, Traffic Stop Federalism: Protecting North 
Carolina Black Drivers from the United States Supreme Court, 48 U. Balt. L. Rev. 323, 352 
& n.230 (2019) (citing Wesby as supportive of a “traffic stop framework” that generates racial 
disparities); Kit Kinports, The Quantum of Suspicion Needed for an Exigent Circumstances 
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This Piece, however, is the first to supplement this burgeoning literature 
with an assessment of Wesby through the lens of property theory. 
The Piece presents two original claims in this regard. First, on interpre-
tive grounds, Part I contends that Wesby generated a de facto reallocation of 
property interests. This suggestion is, as a threshold institutional matter, 
quite jarring, for probable cause jurisprudence has long been tethered to 
the underlying criminal offenses for which the elements are generally deter-
mined by state law. It seems highly unlikely that the Court sought to create 
a pseudofederal common law rule of criminal trespass that would become 
the basis of constitutional analysis under the Fourth Amendment; more 
likely, the Court, in its zeal to protect the police, paid little care to the state 
property law defining the suspected crime for which the arrests were made 
here. Regardless of the Court’s background aims, the decision—to draw on 
the terminological framework coined by Wesley Hohfeld9—effectively abol-
ished (a) the right held by the general public in the District of Columbia 
                                                                                                                           
Search, 52 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 615, 626 & n.57 (2019) (suggesting that Wesby contributes 
to the confusion surrounding the distinction between findings of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion); Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1797, 1836 (2018) (suggesting that any hopes of the Court reassessing its 
qualified immunity jurisprudence were dashed in Wesby); Paul David Stern, Tort Justice 
Reform, 52 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 649, 675 (2019) (describing how Wesby offers questionably 
broad deference to the police under the qualified immunity doctrine, thereby leaving 
victims without a tort remedy); Jordan Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and 
Routine Traffic Stops, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 635, 706 (2019) (lauding Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence in Wesby for questioning “whether [the] Court, in assessing probable cause, 
should continue to ignore why police in fact acted” in qualified immunity cases); Marcus R. 
Nemeth, Note, How Was That Reasonable? The Misguided Development of Qualified 
Immunity and Excessive Force by Law Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 989, 1020 & n.211 
(2019) (querying Justice Thomas’s finding of qualified immunity in Wesby after his having 
critiqued qualified immunity jurisprudence in a separate case just one year prior as embodying 
“precisely the sort of ‘freewheeling policy choice[s]’ that we have previously disclaimed the 
power to make” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 
1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring))); see also Robert Barnes & Ann E. Marimow, Supreme 
Court Rules for Police Officers in D.C. House Party Case that Involved Mystery Hostess Called 
‘Peaches’, Wash. Post (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/ 
supreme-court-rules-for-police-officers-in-dc-house-party-case-that-involved-mystery-hostess-called 
-peaches/2018/01/22/87e5eb4a-fed3-11e7-bb03-722769454f82_story.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (quoting the D.C. Attorney General as remarking that “[Wesby] is an 
important ruling that means that police officers can continue to carry out their vital duty to 
protect public safety”); Rebecca M. Lightle, SCV: Totality of Circumstances Justified Vehicle 
Search, Va. Law. Wkly. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://valawyersweekly.com/2018/08/03/totality-of 
-circumstances-justified-vehicle-search (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining the 
futility of a plaintiff’s argument in challenging a search of his vehicle given Wesby’s rejection 
of an “attempt at a ‘divide and conquer analysis’ of the facts in . . . supporting the probable 
cause determination”). 
 9. In a pair of highly influential articles published over a century ago, Wesley Hohfeld 
developed an analytical framework for understanding interests in property as relational 
pairs. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913). Under this 
framework, if one individual holds a specific entitlement (a right, privilege, power, or 
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(and, by logical extension, other jurisdictions with a comparable criminal 
trespass ordinance) to access without fear of arrest those properties to which 
they reasonably believe they are welcome and (b) the correlative duty of 
titleholders (and, in turn, the police) to respect reasonably mistaken access 
until the mistake is revealed. It replaced this right–duty pairing with a 
strengthened general right of titleholders to exclude others and the 
correlative duty of the public to avoid making even reasonable mistakes as 
to whether their invited entry onto another’s property actually is warranted. 
Second, on normative grounds, Part II calls into question the justifica-
tory nature of the shift from a property allocation that vindicates trust one 
person has placed in another to an allocation that allows someone else to 
violate that trust. In the world of distrust that Wesby creates, recipients of 
invitations are tasked with formally confirming their host’s occupancy 
rights, accepting invitations without such confirmation at the risk of arrest, 
or denying those invitations outright. The consequences of a person’s se-
lecting any one of these options—respectively, breeding distrust, preying 
on vulnerabilities, and fostering social isolation—are disquieting, and the 
economic, privacy, personal responsibility, and pragmatic rationales of-
fered for allowing them to persist ultimately wither under scrutiny. 
The Piece concludes that perceiving Wesby as a property case not only 
will deepen the developing assessments of the decision by scholars of crim-
inal law, but, more broadly, prompt reflection on matters across the prop-
erty spectrum as to the oft-concealed implications that allocative choices 
bring to bear on our ability to trust one another in the marketplace and in 
myriad social settings. 
I. REALLOCATING PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Property law consists of state allocative choices made in the face of 
competing claims to access or exclude others from finite resources, such 
as land, water, or minerals.10 These choices establish the contours of con-
                                                                                                                           
immunity), then the other person involved in that relationship holds the opposite of that 
entitlement (correlatively, a duty, no-right, liability, or disability). For a sample application, 
consider the well-known dispute in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., in which a residential 
construction company sought to drive across Jacque’s barren field to deliver a mobile home 
to Jacque’s neighbor. See 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997). The court found that Jacque 
held the right to exclude Steenberg Homes from accessing Jacque’s field, such that 
Steenberg Homes had a correlative duty not to interfere with Jacque’s exclusionary right 
(and whereby Jacque could file a lawsuit to enforce that right upon Steenberg Homes 
should the company breach that duty). See id. at 159–60. A pilot may, however, have the 
privilege of accessing Jacque’s airspace above a certain altitude, in which case Jacque would 
have no right to enforce against the pilot. 
 10. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 145, 169 
(2018) (“If the state allocates to one party a right to control the use of land or to mine 
subsurface resources, it denies that right and those attendant to it to all others.”); Timothy 
M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 911, 928–29 (outlining how property law 
is understood as a choice made by the state in allocating resources). 
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temporarily legitimate social and market relationships. In turn, they neces-
sarily determine which of those relationships are considered subprime and, 
in select instances, even rise to the level of criminality. The first section 
below explains that, long before the house party at issue in Wesby, the 
District of Columbia required the state to prove that entrants knew or rea-
sonably should have known that all lawful occupants opposed their entry 
in order to yield convictions. The second section concedes that the Court’s 
conclusion that the arrests here did not violate the party attendees’ Fourth 
Amendment right to be free of unwarranted seizure absent probable cause 
does not technically upset this allocative choice.11 By deeming relevant to 
the attendees’ reasonability determination only novel types of evidence 
that will significantly alter how individuals relate to one another, however, 
the decision amounts to a de facto reallocation of property rights. 
A. The District of Columbia’s Allocative Choice 
Decades prior to the arrests at issue in Wesby, the District of Columbia—
upon deciding to criminalize trespass—faced the option of either (a) allo-
cating to lawful occupants the liberty to call on the police to arrest all un-
wanted entrants, or (b) allocating to entrants security from criminal liabil-
ity if they do not bear a certain state of mind. It logically follows that a 
decision as to whether police officers’ arrest of the party attendees here 
for criminally trespassing violated the attendees’ Fourth Amendment right 
to be free of unwarranted seizure absent probable cause necessarily must 
be tied to the District’s prior, underlying choice among these options.12 
The District’s criminal trespass ordinance states, in relevant part, that 
“any person who, without lawful authority, shall enter . . . any . . . property, 
against the will of the lawful occupant . . . shall be deemed guilty.”13 The 
ordinance, therefore, is not explicit as to the requisite mens rea. In a series 
of decisions beginning in the 1960s, however, the District’s appellate 
courts set out what one panel recently described in Ortberg v. United States 
as the jurisdiction’s longstanding “discernible” interpretation of the 
ordinance.14 
                                                                                                                           
 11. An arrest is considered a “seizure” of a person, and thus triggers the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 
 12. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586. The Court also held that, even if it had decided that the 
officers did not have probable cause, the officers reasonably believed that they had probable 
cause and thus were protected from individual liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. 
Id. at 591. For more on qualified immunity, see infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 13. D.C. Code § 22-3302 (2020). The District has adjusted the language of its criminal 
trespass ordinance on two occasions since the arrests at issue in Wesby, though neither set of 
adjustments is material for purposes of the theses advanced here. See Omnibus Public Safety 
and Justice Amendment Act of 2009, 56 D.C. Reg. 7413 (Sept. 11, 2009); Criminal Fine 
Proportionality Amendment Act of 2012, 60 D.C. Reg. 2064 (Jan. 23, 2013); Wesby, 138 S. 
Ct. at 583 (giving the date of the party as March 16, 2008). 
 14. 81 A.3d 303, 308 (D.C. 2013). 
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In Ortberg, the defendant, Adam Ortberg, entered an invitation-only 
fundraiser in a hotel ballroom for the purpose of protesting a congressional 
member’s political stances.15 Mr. Ortberg contended that the District’s crim-
inal trespass ordinance required that the state prove that an entrant “know-
ingly or deliberately defied the wishes” of the lawful occupants.16 He claimed 
that the state failed to meet its burden in this case given that, at least in his 
own mind, the ballroom was not distinctly closed off to members of the 
public walking about the hotel’s lobby.17 A District appellate panel rejected 
Mr. Ortberg’s narrow interpretation of the criminal trespass ordinance’s 
requisite mens rea; at the same time, however, the court noted that the 
legislature had not “signaled its intent to impose strict liability.”18 Instead, 
said the court, the District long ago had struck a middle ground: To obtain 
a conviction, the state must prove that the defendant “‘knew or should have 
known’ that his entry was unwanted” by all lawful occupants.19 
On this standard, the lawful occupants’ opposition to the entry need 
not be subjectively understood by the entrant, but instead may be “objec-
tively manifest through either express or implied means.”20 Pre-Ortberg 
decisions had found such an objective manifestation explicit where the entry 
contravened “a prominently posted warning”21 or a “sign and . . . public 
announcement”22 and implicit where “at least some of the windows” of a 
home were “boarded over”23 or a construction site was encircled by barbed-
wire fencing and locked gates.24 Where the lawful occupants’ opposition to 
the entry is not subjectively understood by the entrant and such objective 
                                                                                                                           
 15. Id. at 305. 
 16. Id. at 306. 
 17. See id. at 305–06. 
 18. Id. at 307. Missouri is the only state that explicitly designates criminal trespass as a 
strict liability offense. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 569.150 (West 2017) (“A person commits trespass 
in the second degree if he or she enters unlawfully upon real property of another. This is 
an offense of absolute liability.”). Several other state statutes, like the District ordinance at 
issue in Wesby, do not identify a mens rea requirement. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. §§ 11.46.320, 
11.46.330 (2019); Idaho Code § 18-7008 (2019); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 120 (West 
2019); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-159.12, 14-159.13 (2019); Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.245 (2019); Tex. 
Penal Code § 30.05 (2019); Va. Code § 18.2-119 (2019). It is conceivable that courts in those 
jurisdictions could interpret those statutes as imposing strict liability. A Virginia court, 
though, decided against such an interpretation. See Reed v. Commonwealth, 366 S.E.2d 
274, 278 (Va. 1988) (“As a penal statute, . . . the Virginia criminal trespass statute has been 
uniformly construed to require a willful trespass.”). 
 19. Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 305 (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. at 308. 
 21. Artisst v. United States, 554 A.2d 327, 330 (D.C. 1989). 
 22. Bowman v. United States, 212 A.2d 610, 611 (D.C. 1965). 
 23. Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d 1174, 1177 (D.C. 1985). 
 24. Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438, 440 (D.C. 1971); see also McGloin v. United 
States, 232 A.2d 90, 91 (D.C. 1967) (noting that “no one would contend that one may lawfully 
enter a private dwelling house simply because there is no sign or warning forbidding entry” 
(emphasis added)). 
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manifestations are absent, the entry is considered presumptively permitted 
on the theory that the lawful occupant has implicitly consented to it.25 
The property allocation Ortberg describes can be explained in the fol-
lowing Hohfeldian terms: Persons who reasonably—though mistakenly—
trust, through interactions with others, that they are authorized to enter 
land titled in someone other than themselves “own” a right of temporary 
access to that land, which immunizes them from criminal prosecution so 
long as they withdraw as soon as their mistake is revealed.26 In turn, the 
titleholder owns the power to call on the police to seek the arrest and jail-
ing of any entrant except in instances of an entrant’s reasonable mistake. 
At bottom, then, the ordinance allocates to all individuals the liberty to 
enter premises of another during the period that they do not know and 
should not reasonably be aware that all lawful occupants of those premises 
oppose the entry, and allocates to lawful occupants security against entry 
by the billions of individuals who know or should know that their entry is 
universally unwanted. 
Of course, persons of interest to the police often, at least initially, pre-
sent innocent accounts of suspicious behavior.27 With this in mind, the 
Supreme Court long has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require 
“only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual 
showing of such activity,” to support an arrest.28 On this standard, mere 
circumstantial evidence that controverts an innocent account is sufficient 
to support a probable cause finding;29 it need not even be preponderant 
                                                                                                                           
 25. On implicit consent, see infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 26. On Hohfeld’s framework, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. Other jurisdic-
tions apparently provide greater protections to entrants than does the District’s law. For 
instance, in some jurisdictions with statutes requiring that the state prove that entrants had 
knowledge that they were making an unwanted intrusion, courts have explicitly confirmed 
that mere proof that entrants should have known that their entry was unwarranted is insuffi-
cient to establish the requisite mens rea. See, e.g., State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 689 (Me. 
1987); State v. Santiago, 527 A.2d 963, 965 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); Commonwealth 
v. Sherlock, 473 A.2d 629, 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); State v. Fanger, 665 A.2d 36, 38 (Vt. 1995). 
 27. See Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Rarely 
will a suspect fail to proffer an innocent explanation for his suspicious behavior.”). 
 28. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 584 (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 243–44 & n.13 (1983)). 
 29. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that police 
officers were not required to accept defendant’s proffered innocent explanation of events on 
faith alone but were rather entitled to weigh it against other potentially inculpatory facts). 
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of guilt.30 However, while this requirement “is not a high bar,”31 the “facts 
and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information”32 must be “sufficient to warrant a 
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circum-
stances shown, that the suspect has committed . . . an offense” as defined 
by the applicable state law.33 
From the foregoing discussion, it follows that assessing whether prob-
able cause exists in a particular situation involves comparing (a) the “rea-
sonably trustworthy information” available to the arresting officers with 
(b) the elements of the alleged offense.34 Therefore, on the Wesby facts, a 
prudent officer in the responding officers’ shoes presumably must have 
had some evidence—not necessarily evidence of a weight and quality 
sufficient to garner a conviction, but some “reasonably trustworthy” evi-
dence—that the attendees that officer chose to arrest for criminal trespass-
ing possessed the state of mind required by the District’s criminal trespass 
law, i.e., that these attendees knew or should have known that their entry was 
unwanted by all lawful occupants.35 As the following section sets out, how-
                                                                                                                           
 30. See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2013) (noting that “[f]inely tuned 
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence . 
. . have no place in the . . . decision” on whether officers had probable cause (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 235)); Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (“[T]he 
term ‘probable cause’ . . . means less than evidence which would justify condemnation . . . . 
It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813))); 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972) (asserting that probable cause “does not require 
the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to 
support a conviction”). 
 31. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)); 
see also Maren J. Messing, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Reaffirming a Limited Exception, 
44 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 33, 64 (2010) (“[P]robable cause is equated with some amount 
of evidence . . . .”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 255, 259 
(2015) (“Police arrests require only probable cause—a very small amount of evidence.”). 
 32. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). 
 33. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). 
 34. See Carr v. District of Columbia, 587 F.3d 401, 410–11 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating 
that the arresting police officers needed to reasonably believe that “the protestors knew no 
permit was granted” in order to arrest them); Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 
602 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Whether any particular set of facts suggest that an arrest is justified by 
probable cause requires an examination of the elements of the crime at issue.”); United 
States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that mere possession of a 
knife does not constitute an unlawful action without the possessor’s intent to use that knife 
in an unlawful manner). 
 35. The Wesby Court could have been far clearer in identifying the state law 
underpinning its decision on probable cause. The lone paragraph explicitly discussing the 
District’s criminal trespass law comes in the form of a critique of the lower court for relying 
on a single decision—Smith v. United States—to conclude that the “knew or should have 
known” standard is “settled law.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 591 (citing Smith v. United States, 281 
A.2d 438, 439–40 (D.C. 1971)). While the lower court could have cited to additional 
decisions eliciting this standard (as noted above, Ortberg surveys a litany of precedents in 
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ever, the considerations that the Wesby Court deemed relevant to an en-
trant’s state of mind suggest that, for all practical purposes, the Supreme 
Court’s decision effectively served to alter the District’s initial allocative 
choice by regarding even reasonably mistaken entrants as strictly liable. 
B. Wesby’s De Facto Reallocation 
The party host, to whom the record refers only as “Peaches,” ulti-
mately confessed that she did not have authority to extend invitations to 
the house party.36 However, as all litigants conceded, there was no evidence 
in the record indicating that she shared this information with any of the 
attendees before the police arrived.37 Indeed, common sense suggests that 
if Peaches actually wanted anyone to attend this party, she would have re-
frained from mentioning to her invitees that she and—thus, they—were 
not actually authorized to enter the house. Drawing on other evidence, 
though, the Wesby Court held that a rational officer in these circumstances 
could have made the “entirely reasonable inference”38 that the attendees 
were “knowingly taking advantage of a vacant house as a venue for their 
late-night party.”39 
In holding that a reasonable officer could have inferred that the 
attendees knew or should have known that they were trespassing, the 
Court pointed to three categories of evidence: the condition of the inte-
rior of the house, the attendees’ conduct at the party, and the attendees’ 
                                                                                                                           
this regard), that it did not do so does not make its conclusion on the operative mens rea 
requirement erroneous. Indeed, Smith seems a sufficient citation to support an explanation of 
the circumstances in which the District wanted there to be criminal punishment for the ordi-
narily civil offense of trespass. In Smith, a company that held title to the relevant parcel of 
land manifested its opposition to the entrant’s access to that parcel by “post[ing] signs 
indicating . . . rightful control of the site.” Smith, 281 A.2d at 440. The Smith court deemed 
the company’s explicit act unambiguous, and therefore concluded that the entrant was not 
entitled to a jury instruction explaining that reasonable mistake is a defense to a criminal tres-
pass charge. Id. at 439–40. Smith noted, though, that such an instruction would be warranted 
when an entrant’s “bona fide belief” is grounded in “some reasonable basis.” Id. at 439. In 
this regard, Wesby sits alongside other recent Fourth Amendment decisions by the Supreme 
Court that rest on what are, at best, underdeveloped depictions of the underlying state 
property laws. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (assuming that, under 
Maryland law, touching the chattel of another without causing damage constitutes a tres-
pass); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006) (assuming that, under Georgia law, 
one lawful resident of a home can preclude another lawful resident from welcoming law 
enforcement officers into the home). 
 36. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 583–84. As for Peaches’s given name, news reports identified 
her as Veronica Little, a woman who, friends said, earned her nickname as a result of her 
Georgian roots. See, e.g., Barnes & Marimow, supra note 8. Ms. Little, who died in 2016, 
“had been a popular fixture at a now-shuttered gentlemen’s club in Northeast Washington 
and often recruited the club’s dancers to perform at parties she organized.” Id. 
 37. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 138 S. 
Ct. 577 (2018). 
38. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maryland v. 
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003)). 
 39. Id. 
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reaction to the officers’ arrival and subsequent questioning.40 Each is ad-
dressed, in turn, below. 
1. Condition of the Interior of the House. — The Court found the interior 
of the premises in a state that showed what it deemed “few signs of inhab-
itance.”41 The Court found insufficient the following indicia of habitation: 
The house included chairs, a mattress, a refrigerator (stocked with food 
and drink) and other large appliances, multiple fixtures, blinds on the 
windows, toiletries in the bathrooms, and working electricity and plumb-
ing.42 Justice Thomas, writing for his colleagues in the majority, articulated 
what he described as the “common-sense conclusion[]”43 that “[m]ost 
homeowners do not live in near-barren houses” of this sort.44 
If one assumes that this type of evidence is relevant to the requisite 
state of mind for criminal trespass in the District, one could well question 
the Court’s conclusion that the weight and quality of this evidence here 
provides probable cause. The Justices’ internal standard for what they as-
serted “most homeowners” would do to furnish and live in their properties 
demonstrates a disturbing lack of perspective on the throes of poverty, un-
employment, and housing affordability that currently grip so many parts 
of the nation, including the locus of the Wesby dispute, which ironically sits 
just over three miles to the east of the Justices’ chambers.45 Furniture 
expenses are one of the first places the desperately poor look for savings in 
especially hard times.46 Moreover, upon entering the house here, the 
attendees would have readily observed a number of the very items—lighting, 
                                                                                                                           
 40. See id. at 586–87. 
 41. Id. at 586. 
 42. Id. 
43. Id. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 231 (1983)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Driving Directions from the Supreme Court of the United States to Fort Dupont, D.C., 
Google Maps, http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/T7VZ-V4NU] (last visited Mar. 10, 
2020) (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point field for “Supreme Court of 
the United States” and search destination field for “Fort Dupont, D.C.”); see also Perry Stein, 
As D.C. Families Get Richer, Staggering Disparities Persist, Report Finds, Wash. Post (Apr. 18, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/as-dc-families-get-richer-staggering-disparities-
persist-report-finds/2017/04/17/8fa41700-238a-11e7-b503-9d616bd5a305_story.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the income disparity that exists between the District’s 
wards east of Anacostia and the rest of D.C.). 
 46. See Tola Mbakwe, Christians Against Poverty Highlights Stats on People Who Don’t 
Own Beds, Premier Christian News (June 14, 2017), https://www.premier.org.uk/News/UK/ 
Christians-Against-Poverty-highlights-stats-on-people-who-don-t-own-beds [https://perma.cc/ 
FB2X-JEWM]; Sarah Woolley, As Living Costs Rise, Furniture Poverty Grows Behind Closed 
Doors, Guardian (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2016/mar/ 
02/living-costs-rise-furniture-poverty-beds [https://perma.cc/R2U2-UDJ5]; see also Chico 
Harlan, Rental America: Why the Poor Pay $4,150 for a $1,500 Sofa, Wash. Post (Oct. 16, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/10/16/she-bought-a-sofa-on-
installment-payments-now-its-straining-her-life/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1c61f1d05ee8 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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seating, music, dance space, food, drink, and restrooms—that twenty-
something-year-old invitees might hope to find at a party of this nature. 
More significantly, though, the Court did not justify the assumption 
on which the discussion in the preceding paragraphs rests: Why should the 
condition of the interior of the house serve as the type of evidence that 
indicates that the attendees should have known that their host did not 
have authority to invite them in the first place?47 The attendees did not 
break boards or windows on the house’s exterior to enter.48 Instead, they 
were welcomed in through the front door.49 Even if the furniture inside 
was sparse, that is unsurprising for newly rented units, particularly those 
occupied by the young and poor. Should the attendees have found the 
condition of the interior of the house undesirable for a party, they could 
have left on arrival (and, indeed, some invitees may have done so and for-
tuitously avoided being swept up in the mass arrest that followed). But 
whether or not individuals find the condition of the interior of the house 
suitable enough for the purpose for which they received the invitation 
does not seem germane to whether those individuals knew or should have 
known that their entry was opposed by all lawful occupants. 
2. Conduct at the Party. — In terms of the attendees’ conduct at the 
party, the Court pointed to the fact that the music was “so loud that it 
could be heard outside” past one o’clock in the morning.50 The Court also 
noted that select officers varyingly alleged that they smelled marijuana, saw 
beer bottles and cups of liquor, and found the floor unclean.51 Further, 
the Court asserted that officers observed some of the attendees reveling in 
a “living room [that] had been converted into a makeshift strip club” and 
found male guests upstairs with a “naked woman” and a “used condom.”52 
If these considerations are relevant to a police officer’s determination 
as to whether people should have known that all lawful occupants opposed 
their entry, then entrants necessarily must have these same considerations 
                                                                                                                           
 47. In other words, if the Court’s discussion is understood to concentrate on the weight 
of the evidence that is relevant to the requisite state of mind for criminal trespass in the 
District, it would seem that the decision has nothing to say about the substantive content of 
the underlying criminal trespass offense. If, however, the Court’s discussion is understood—
as this Piece suggests—to concentrate on types of evidence that are relevant to the requisite 
state of mind for criminal trespass in the District, the decision can be interpreted to 
effectively, if implicitly, alter the substantive content of that underlying offense by adjusting 
the state of mind requirement. 
 48. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 841 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 765 
F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586–87. 
 51. Id. at 587. The Court’s reference to marijuana is surprising, given the appellate 
court’s assessment: “[T]he arrest report says that Officer Parker recovered marijuana inside 
the house, but he acknowledged in his deposition that he smelled—but did not find—
marijuana. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that any of the officers observed any 
drug-related activity.” Wesby, 765 F.3d at 17 n.1. 
 52. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 587. 
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in mind when they step onto property for which they do not hold title. Yet 
the Court did not explain why loud music or the late hour should be con-
sidered the type of evidence that would indicate to attendees that they 
should have known that their host did not have authority to extend the 
party invitation. After all, countless lawful occupants commit noise nui-
sances or stay up late across the country on a daily basis. If anything, at-
tendees at what they know or should know to be an unauthorized party 
might be inclined to keep the decibel level more and more discrete the 
later it gets. Likewise, the Court did not explain why people who upon 
arrival at a party smell marijuana, detect dirty floors, observe others drink-
ing alcohol or dancing exotically, or find the remnants of protected sex in 
a bedroom should immediately leave the home on the thought that all 
lawful occupants must have opposed their entry.53 The Court asserted that 
“most homeowners do not invite people over” to engage in these types of 
activities without acknowledging that some, of course, do.54 The Court’s 
silence on these matters seemingly amounts to an implicit moral critique 
of what are all legal behaviors, which the opinion buttressed by explicitly 
describing the goings-on at the party as “debauchery.”55 The Court drew 
on this critique to make the insupportable deduction that, since these 
persons were acting immorally, they must have known that their invitation 
to the party—their alleged property right—came from an unauthorized 
source. 
3. Reaction to the Officers’ Arrival and Questioning. — As for the 
attendees’ reaction to the officers’ arrival and subsequent questioning, the 
Court pointed to evidence indicating that many of the attendees did not 
reference Peaches by name when explaining to the police which person 
                                                                                                                           
 53. The opinion is riddled with conclusory assertions of the following nature: “[T]he 
officers could consider the drug use inside the house as evidence that the partygoers knew their 
presence was unwelcome.” See id. at 586–87 & n.5; see also Elura Nanos, Justice Thomas Wrote 
About Thongs, Strippers and Lap Dances and His Opinion Only Gets Better, Law & Crime 
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://lawandcrime.com/uncategorized/justice-thomas-wrote-about-thongs-
strippers-and-bras-and-his-opinion-only-gets-better [https://perma.cc/946K-6NDV] (“Justice 
Thomas brought a level of pragmatism to this case that’s tough to dispute. When cops come 
upon a scene that so clearly indicates likely criminal activity, their suspicion isn’t—and 
shouldn’t be—negated just because someone is presenting what might be an innocent 
explanation.”). But see Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (No. 15-1485) 
(documenting Justice Kagan’s remark that “it just is not obvious that the reasonable partygoer 
is supposed to walk into this apartment and say: Got to get out of here.”); Wesby, 765 F.3d at 17 
n.1 (explaining that, on the appellate court’s reading of the record, none of the police officers 
actually observed any drug-related activity on the premises); see also Richard Re, Fourth 
Amendment Fairness, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1409, 1420–21 (2018) (advocating a “perspectival 
reorientation” of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from a focus on “whether an 
officer is reasonable in performing the search or seizure at issue” to a focus on “whether police 
actions are morally acceptable to rights holders”). 
 54. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586–87 & n.5. 
 55. Id. at 583. See also id. at 588, 591 (describing the attendees as treating the house as 
if their host were not a lawful occupant, despite the fact that the attendees did not damage the 
property in any way); id. (critiquing the lower court for “brush[ing] aside the drinking and 
the lap dances,” despite the fact that drinking and lap dances are undeniably legal activities). 
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had invited them to the party.56 It is unsurprising, though, that some 
attendees would receive an invitation from Peaches herself and that others 
would receive it second hand.57 The Court also referenced one officer’s 
testimony that select attendees “scattered” up the stairs when the officers 
entered the property.58 Yet while one could imagine a person running up-
stairs in an attempt to escape a number of charges (e.g., running upstairs 
to dispose of illegal narcotics), it seems counterintuitive to suggest that 
one who is trying to escape a trespass charge would run up the stairs given 
that whether a person is upstairs or downstairs is immaterial to whether 
that person committed the crime. Moreover, while evidence of flight can 
be considered in deciding whether probable cause exists to make an arrest 
when “coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating 
the suspect to the evidence of crime,”59 longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent makes clear that it is “not necessarily indicative of ongoing 
criminal activity.”60 Documented disproportionate targeting of racial mi-
norities by police—and every person in attendance at this party was African 
American—suggests that flight “might just as easily be motivated by the 
desire to avoid the recurring indignity of being racially profiled as by the 
desire to hide criminal activity.”61 
                                                                                                                           
 56. Id. at 583, 587–88. 
 57. Even accepting as appropriate the unjustified assumption that select attendees’ 
failure to identify Peaches by name could be considered among the types of evidence that 
are probative of whether those attendees knew or should have known that they were on the 
property against the will of all lawful occupants, such a failure, of course, is not relevant to 
the attendees who did identify her by name. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 86 
(1979) (“[A] person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal 
activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.”). 
 58. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 583, 588. This officer’s testimony sat alongside that of others, who 
testified that one of the attendees voluntarily opened the door when the officers knocked and 
that many others remained seated in the living room upon the officers’ entry. Id. at 583. 
 59. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66–67 (1968). 
 60. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
 61. Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 340 (Mass. 2016); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Transcript of Keynote Speech, 54 Idaho L. Rev. 287, 290 (2018) (“I grew up 
on the south side of Chicago. My guess is a lot of people on the south side of Chicago, and 
especially African-American and Latino men, have every reason to go in the other direction 
when they see the police.”). Even accepting as appropriate the unjustified assumption that 
scattering up the stairs upon the sight of police officers could be considered among the 
types of evidence probative of the claim that select attendees knew or should have known 
that they were on the property against the will of all lawful occupants, scattering is not 
relevant to the large number of attendees who did not scatter but nonetheless were swept 
up in the mass arrest. See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 583, 588 (describing how select partygoers hid 
and scattered into different parts of the house when they saw the police officers); Sibron, 392 
U.S. at 62–63 (suggesting that proximity to others who might be engaged in illegal activities 
is “simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police 
upon an individual’s personal security”). 
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C. Summary: Reallocating Property Rights 
Consider a situation in which, assuming all other facts remained un-
changed, Peaches hosted this party under the good faith though mistaken 
impression that she was a lawful tenant. In such a situation, it seems im-
plausible that a court would consider the condition of the interior of the 
house, the attendees’ conduct at the party, select attendees’ racing upstairs 
upon the officers’ arrival, or information suggesting that some attendees 
received the invitation second hand as evidence that all attendees knew or 
should have known that all lawful occupants opposed their entry. It is 
unclear why Peaches’s admission to the police that she did not have 
authority to host the party suddenly makes those considerations relevant. 
For all practical purposes, the Wesby decision abolished the right held 
by the general public to access without fear of arrest those properties to 
which they reasonably believe they are welcome and the correlative duty 
of titleholders (and, in turn, the police) to respect reasonably mistaken 
access until the mistake is revealed. It replaced this right–duty pairing with 
a strengthened general right of titleholders to exclude others and the cor-
relative duty of the public to avoid making even reasonable mistakes as to 
whether their invited entry onto another’s property is actually warranted. 
At least until those jurisdictions that have adopted something akin to a 
“knew or should have known” mens rea requirement take affirmative steps 
to provide clarity on the types of mistakes that fall outside the reach of 
their criminal trespass laws, Wesby effectively entitles the police in these 
jurisdictions to operate—as a matter of constitutional law—on the assump-
tion that trespassers are more likely than nontrespassers to accept second-
hand invitations to attend late-night parties involving loud music, the smell 
of marijuana, alcohol consumption, protected sex, and exotic dancing in 
lightly furnished homes with dirty floors. 
II. JUSTIFYING REALLOCATION 
Property, as an institution socially crafted to benefit the public inter-
est, exists in service of our democratic values. Indeed, it is accountable to 
these values. When justified in maintenance of such accountability, the 
state must reallocate property interests as social, economic, and moral 
perspectives on the content of these values—and perspectives on what 
might harm these values—evolve over time. The prior Part contends that 
Wesby effectively generated a reallocation in the sense that it converted a 
temporary access interest in reasonably mistaken entrants into a robust 
exclusionary interest in titleholders. In this Part, the first section portrays 
the consequences—the world of distrust—that Wesby’s reallocation, taken 
to its logical end, portends. The second section critically evaluates the avail-
able justifications, some articulated in the Wesby decision and others left 
unsaid, for allowing these consequences to persist. 
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A. A New World of Distrust 
In the world Wesby’s de facto reallocation creates, one can most com-
fortably protect oneself from the threat of criminal arrest only by adhering 
to the personal presumption that any person who claims to hold a property 
interest—even a close confidant—is deceitful. To eliminate this threat, the 
recipient of what reasonably appears to be a valid social invitation seem-
ingly has three options. 
One option would be to attempt to acquire formal proof of title. In some 
instances, this could involve performing a title search in the hall of records. 
In others—including in the many jurisdictions that do not require lease-
holds of a year or less to be recorded, such as the District of Columbia—it 
likely would require confronting and demanding proof from the alleged 
host. 
The downsides of this approach are plain enough. To check up on a 
friend or a new acquaintance kind enough to invite you to a social engage-
ment may produce distrust on the inviter’s part and the untoward result 
of spoiling that relationship. This possibility is especially pronounced in a 
situation akin to the circumstances underlying Wesby: Given that all of the 
evidence the Court deemed relevant to the attendees’ knowing they were 
trespassing only could have been obtained once they arrived at the party, 
the attendees would have had to confront the host face-to-face about 
whether she really was who she said she was.62 Even if one were somehow 
able to verify an inviter’s right to host a social engagement without the 
inviter’s knowledge, one nonetheless may feel tormented about having 
done so and, in internalizing that torment, materially threaten the 
development of a relationship with the inviter. 
For these reasons, some recipients will recoil at the thought of ques-
tioning the veracity of an inviter’s representation of authority to extend an 
invitation. Persons in this position might select an alternative option of de-
clining social invitations outright. This option, too, is rife with ill effects. The 
more one declines such invitations, the more one isolates oneself. Mounting 
contemporary research suggests that social isolation, in an objective sense—
                                                                                                                           
 62. The Wesby record indicates that the responding officers contacted the titleholder 
from the scene of the party by phone. However, it does not indicate whether and, if so, how 
they confirmed the titleholder’s identity. It seems unlikely that they performed a formal title 
check or engaged in any other investigative work to confirm that the person with whom they 
were speaking was indeed the titleholder. Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 18 n.2 
(D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (“The record does not make clear how Officer 
Parker obtained Hughes’s contact information or whether, at the time of the arrests, the police 
had made any independent efforts to verify that Hughes was in fact the owner of the house.”). 
The Court, though, seemingly expects this type of investigative work from the attendees. 
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that is, separate and apart from subjective feelings of loneliness63—has 
critical emotional and physiological consequences.64 
                                                                                                                           
 63. It is possible for someone to be socially isolated and not lonely, just as it is possible 
for someone to feel lonely despite myriad social connections. Indeed, numerous studies 
have suggested that loneliness and social isolation are not significantly correlated. See, e.g., 
Caitlin E. Coyle & Elizabeth Dugan, Social Isolation, Loneliness and Health Among Older 
Adults, 24 J. Aging & Health 1346, 1347 (2012); Carla M. Persinotto, Irena Stijacic Cenzer 
& Kenneth E. Covinsky, Loneliness in Older Persons: A Predictor of Functional Decline and 
Death, 174 Archives Internal Med. 1078, 1078 (2012). For a prominent individual example, 
one of the world’s most popular movie stars, Robin Williams, was regularly surrounded by 
family, acquaintances, and adoring fans, yet admitted to feeling lonely, and some analysts 
attribute Williams’s suicide to his lonely state. See Andrew Solomon, Suicide, A Crime of 
Loneliness, New Yorker (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-
comment/suicide-crime-loneliness (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 64. On an emotional level, social engagement sits at the heart of well-being. We 
fundamentally need others in our lives with whom we have the opportunity to develop 
quality reciprocal relations, others on whom we can depend, and, in turn, others who can 
depend on us. See, e.g., John T. Cacioppo & William Patrick, Loneliness: Human Nature 
and the Need for Social Connection 5–8 (2008) (describing how chronic loneliness and 
social isolation disrupt humans’ perceptions, behavior, physiology, and health outcomes). 
These relationships give life meaning. It is reaffirming for people to know that they have the 
capacity to find shared interests, understanding, and joy in circles in which their presence 
and contributions are valued. See Dhruv Khullar, How Social Isolation Is Killing Us, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/upshot/how-social-isolation-
is-killing-us.html [https://perma.cc/9KEP-YKVG]. When the social circles to which one has 
access shrink, that person experiences, whether consciously or not, what one physician 
terms a “sadness of . . . solitude.” Id. 
  On a physiological level, researchers have determined that social isolation impairs 
immune system functionality; increases inflammation (which, in turn, can increase the risk 
of many diseases, including heart disease (by twenty-nine percent) and stroke (by thirty-two 
percent)); produces higher levels of stress hormones; and elevates blood pressure. Nicole 
K. Valtorta, Mona Kanaan, Simon Gilbody, Sara Ronzi & Barbara Hanratty, Loneliness and 
Social Isolation as Risk Factors for Coronary Heart Disease and Stroke: Systematic Review 
and Meta-Analysis of Longitudinal Observational Studies, 102 BMJ: Heart 1009, 1012–14 
(2016); see also, e.g., Bert N. Uchino, Social Support and Health: A Review of Physiological 
Processes Potentially Underlying Links to Disease Outcomes, 29 J. Behav. Med. 377, 377–87 
(2006) (examining evidence linking social support to changes in cardiovascular, endocrine, 
and immune function). These detrimental effects are not confined to the elderly; socially 
isolated children have been found to face significantly poorer health twenty years later. 
Khullar, supra. Recent studies suggest that social isolation leads to an increased mortality 
rate that is comparable to and, in some cases exceeds, more commonly and well-accepted 
risk factors such as smoking a full pack of cigarettes per day, obesity, and breathing polluted 
air. See Julianne Holt-Lunstad, Timothy B. Smith, Mark Baker, Tyler Harris & David 
Stephenson, Loneliness and Social Isolation as Risk Factors for Mortality: A Meta-Analytic 
Review, 10 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 227, 235 (2015) (revealing that actual and perceived lack 
of social connection is statistically as harmful to human health as common risk factors for 
mortality); Julianne Holt-Lunstad, Timothy B. Smith & J. Bradley Layton, Social 
Relationships and Mortality Risk: A Meta-Analytic Review, PLOS Med., July 2010, at 1, 14 
(associating strong social relationships with a fifty percent reduced risk of early death). To 
reiterate a point noted in the text, these studies conclude that people who are socially iso-
lated but genuinely do not feel lonely are at an increased risk of premature death. Moreover, 
there is evidence of a “dose-response” effect, such that for each level increase in social isola-
tion there is an attendant increase in the risk of premature mortality. See Yang Claire Yang, 
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Those who are disinclined to acquire proof of title but seek to avoid so-
cial isolation—whether consciously or not—may pursue a third option: Accept 
the invitation at the risk of arrest. Risking arrest is significant for a number 
of general reasons. Arrests have a tendency to remain on one’s criminal 
record for extensive time periods even when the alleged crimes on which 
those arrests were based are never prosecuted.65 An arrest record, even for 
relatively minor offenses, can make it difficult to find employment or 
housing, leading to derivative consequences in terms of poverty, hunger, 
homelessness, child support, and child custody arrangements.66 An arrest 
also, of course, can trigger a review of the arrestee’s immigration status.67 
                                                                                                                           
Courtney Boen, Karen Gerken, Ting Li, Kristen Schorpp & Kathleen Mullan Harris, Social 
Relationships and Physiological Determinants of Longevity Across the Human Life Span, 
113 PNAS 578, 578–83 (2016). As Professor John Cacioppo notes, “For a social species, to 
be on the edge of the social perimeter is to be in a dangerous position.” Sanjay Gupta, Why 
You Should Treat Loneliness as a Chronic Illness, Everyday Health, https://www.everyday 
health.com/news/loneliness-can-really-hurt-you [https://perma.cc/BM28-RC2L] (last updated 
Aug. 4, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting John Cacioppo). 
Social engagement also produces very practical, behavioral responses. Socially isolated 
persons do not have someone to check on them, take them to the doctor, recognize disease 
symptoms, or help them manage stress. See, e.g., Traci Watson, The Dangers of Social 
Isolation, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/social-isolation [https:// 
perma.cc/JX3W-VTXN] (“There are plenty of people who are socially isolated but who are 
perfectly happy with that . . . . But even then we should be trying to make sure there’s enough 
contacts with them so that if something goes wrong . . . they’re going to be advised and 
supported.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Andrew Steptoe)). Recent studies 
also suggest that socially isolated persons are less likely to eat nutritiously, exercise, get adequate 
sleep, and take prescribed medications. See, e.g., M. Robbin DiMatteo, Social Support and 
Patient Adherence to Medical Treatment: A Meta-Analysis, 23 Health Psychol. 207, 207–14 
(2004); M. Robbin DiMatteo, Variations in Patients’ Adherence to Medical Recommendations: 
A Quantitative Review of 50 Years of Research, 42 Med. Care 200, 200–08 (2004). 
 65. See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, Opinion, Have You Ever Been Arrested? Check Here, 
N.Y. Times (May 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/opinion/have-you-ever-
been-arrested-check-here.html [https://perma.cc/377N-45RU]. 
 66. See, e.g., James R. Acker, Reliable Justice: Advancing the Twofold Aim of Establishing 
Guilt and Protecting the Innocent, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 719, 728 (2019) (“The arrest decision is 
momentous in its own right, and it carries potentially profound implications downstream in 
the criminal justice process.”); Picking up the Pieces: A Minneapolis Case Study, ACLU (Apr. 
15, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/issues/racial-justice/race-and-criminal-justice/picking-pieces? 
redirect=feature/picking-pieces [https://perma.cc/99N2-5DCW] (quoting a state court judge 
explaining the cascading effect of a low-level arrest resulting in the arrestee losing his job 
for spending the night in jail, leading to a missed paycheck and child support payment, and 
the county subsequently holding him in contempt in an effort to encourage payment). 
 67. See, e.g., Jason G. Idilbi, Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law: Should 
North Carolina Communities Implement 287(g) Authority?, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1710, 1717 
(2008) (describing the process by which a correctional officer can conduct an investigation 
into an arrestee’s immigration status if there is a suspicion that the arrestee is undocumented). 
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For some, the risk of arrest is significant for more specific reasons: 
Namely, the risk of arrest is not distributed equally, particularly across ra-
cial lines.68 Analysts have pointed to multiple drivers of racial disparities in 
criminal arrest statistics. Contemporary discriminatory motivations play a 
role, as do longstanding structural inequalities that can undergird police 
departments’ decisions on where to position their officers.69 The discretion 
afforded the police in making arrests matters, too, and may be especially 
meaningful when low-level crimes like trespassing (and disorderliness, 
lurking, spitting, “manner of walking,” etc.) are at stake because these 
crimes are victimless and do not result in property damage.70 Yet the extent 
to which racialized policing is attributable to certain variables more than 
others in a given jurisdiction is of little matter to individual persons of 
color who receive a social invitation. The task, in that moment, is to reflect 
on the reality that, if they accept the invitation, they may well be subjugated 
because of the color of their skin. 
B. Potential Justifications 
The preceding section suggests that, in Wesby’s wake, the recipient of what rea-
sonably appears to be a valid social invitation is, for all practical purposes, faced with 
                                                                                                                           
 68. Though select incidents of racialized policing recently have gained national atten-
tion—perhaps most notoriously the unwarranted arrests of two African American men await-
ing a business associate at a Philadelphia Starbucks—these incidents merely are symptomatic 
of the reality that racial minorities disproportionately are arrested (and convicted and sub-
jected to more stringent sentences) on a routine basis in countless locales nationwide. See, 
e.g., Lynda Garcia, ACLU of N.J., Selective Policing: Racially Disparate Enforcement of Low-
Level Offenses in New Jersey 18–62 (2015), https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/7214/5070/6701/ 
2015_12_21_aclunj_select_enf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RC4-7RFB] (recounting racially dispar-
ate enforcement in the New Jersey cities of Millville, Elizabeth, New Brunswick, and Jersey City); 
U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department 12–19 
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [https://perma.cc/E5BT-G3SK] 
[hereinafter Baltimore Police Investigation] (describing racially disparate enforcement in 
Baltimore, Maryland); Thomas Maier & Ann Choi, Unequal Justice, Newsday (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://projects.newsday.com/long-island/unequal-justice-part-1 [https://perma.cc/AEB2-K4 
VJ] (recounting racially disparate enforcement on Long Island, New York); Press Release, 
ACLU, ACLU Commends Grand Rapids Police Decision to End Trespass Policy that Led to 
Disproportionate Arrest of African-Americans, ACLU (June 29, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/ 
news/aclu-commends-grand-rapids-police-decision-end-trespass-policy-led-disproportionate-arrest 
[https://perma.cc/265S-9H2Z] (recounting racially disparate enforcement in Grand Rapids, 
Michigan). The federal government’s investigation of Baltimore’s policing practices 
revealed some particularly horrific anecdotes. In one example, a shift commander’s email to 
his subordinates included a template for documenting trespass arrests that pre-filled the race 
and gender of the arrestee with the phrase “black male” rather than leaving that space for com-
pletion by the arresting officer. Baltimore Police Investigation, supra, at 37. 
 69. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and Punishment in the Twentieth and Twenty-
First Centuries, 44 Crime & Just. 49, 68 (2015). 
 70. See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits 
of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 Geo. L.J. 1419, 1422 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Max Ehrenfreund, The Risks of Walking While Black in Ferguson, Wash. Post (Mar. 4, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/04/95-percent-of-people-
arrested-for-jaywalking-in-ferguson-were-black (on file with the Columbia Law Review)). 
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the following three options: (a) accept the invitation only on proof of occupancy; 
(b) decline the invitation; or (c) accept the invitation without seeking proof of occu-
pancy at the risk of arrest, a risk that is disproportionately distributed. The conse-
quences of a person selecting one of these options—respectively, breeding distrust, 
fostering social isolation, and preying on vulnerabilities—are undoubtedly con-
cerning. One must ask: What countervailing interests might be deemed sufficient 
to justify putting recipients of social invitations in such a precarious position? 
The Wesby Court did not offer an especially clear answer to this inquiry. 
Reading between the lines, though, its decision rests on an ineffective com-
bination of economic, privacy, personal responsibility, and pragmatic ra-
tionales. On the economic front, placing the onus of a title search—or the 
risk of proceeding without one—on a person who receives a social 
invitation has only marginal effects in terms of greasing the wheels of volun-
tary exchanges on the open market. A person who causes no damage to the 
premises and, upon learning that entry is unauthorized, is willing to depart 
immediately is unlikely to impact the titleholder’s class of potential tenants 
in any meaningful way. For the same reasons, the impact on market ex-
changes seems minimal even if persons lied about the extent to which they 
believed their occupation was lawful, for only a very temporary, nontitled 
interest is at play here. 
In terms of privacy, one must acknowledge that the titleholder in Wesby 
did not open his property up to third parties in the same manner that the 
titleholder did in the classic criminal trespass case of State v. Shack.71 The 
titleholder’s choice in Shack—to commercially farm his land in the way 
that he did—resulted in a substantial sacrifice of his privacy interest on 
certain parts of his land, including within the barracks he built to house 
his farmworkers.72 Still, though, the unwitting host in Wesby was an 
                                                                                                                           
 71. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371 (N.J. 1971). 
 72. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 
1063, 1067 (2009) (describing how State v. Shack and its progeny resulted in a standard 
whereby the more private property is committed to public use, the more limited the owner’s 
right to exclude). The U.S. Supreme Court decided in Marsh v. Alabama that, where a 
company effectively owned an entire town, a Jehovah’s Witness’s free speech was assured on 
the company’s sidewalks. See 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946); Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: 
Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 633, 664 n.175 (1991). In its ensuing 
opinion in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. in 1968, the 
Court likened an enclosed shopping mall to the company town in Marsh, thereby protecting 
the First Amendment right to peacefully picket within the mall’s “common” spaces. See 391 
U.S. 308, 317–19 (1968), abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). The Shack 
court asserted that some large farms might look precisely like the company town in Marsh 
and its equivalent in Logan Valley Plaza but that it was not clear that the farm here necessarily 
expressed those characteristics. See Shack, 277 A.2d at 371. To decide the case on Marsh 
grounds, then, said the court, would require “an extension of Marsh.” Id. at 371. While 
subsequent federal court decisions declined to extend Marsh to open air malls and critiqued 
Marsh’s “public function” test by contending that company towns were a relic of the past, 
see, e.g., Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 517; Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561 (1972), later 
compositions of the New Jersey Supreme Court took up Shack’s invitation to apply Marsh’s 
logic to myriad circumstances. See, e.g., N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. 
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absentee owner who was engaged in negotiations with the prospective 
tenant who invited the party attendees onto the property.73 While these facts 
certainly are not sufficient to make the property unfailingly public, they 
support the argument that the unwitting host’s privacy was not implicated 
in a significant way. Unlike, perhaps, an owner’s personal interest in a 
residence,74 the absentee owner’s interest in a vacant unit is a fungible in-
vestment interest.75 In these circumstances, when attendees are willing to 
depart at the request of the police without causing any harm to the premises, 
the impact on the owner’s investment interest is trivial and, therefore, does 
not require accommodation here. 
In terms of personal responsibility, titleholders may be of the mind 
that recipients of social invitations should take it upon themselves to per-
form the necessary legwork to decide whether an opportunity presented is 
one in which they should take advantage. To nonowners, though, those 
privileged to own property do so with the inherent responsibility of keeping 
                                                                                                                           
J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 780 (N.J. 1994) (recognizing the ability of advocates 
against military intervention in the Persian Gulf to distribute antiwar leaflets in the common 
spaces of shopping malls when those malls had encouraged other nonshopping activities on 
their premises in the past); Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 375–76 (N.J. 
1982) (limiting casino’s ability to expel a black jack patron engaged in legally permissible 
“card counting” that improved his advantage against the house); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 
615, 623–24, 629 (N.J. 1980) (finding a state constitutional free speech right to distribute 
political leaflets on a private university campus in light of the fact that the university had 
welcomed abundant public uses of its facilities and resources in an effort to fulfill its 
educational ideals). While in Community for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ 
Ass’n the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a homeowner’s association had not sufficiently 
held its community open to the public to subject its lawn sign restrictions to a free speech 
challenge, see 929 A.2d 1060, 1073 (N.J. 2007), the general message of the Schmid/Uston/J.M.B. 
line of cases survives Twin Rivers wholly intact: “[T]he more private property is devoted to public 
use, the more it must accommodate the rights which inhere in individual members of the 
general public who use that property.” Uston, 445 A.2d at 374 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Schmid, 423 A.2d at 629). 
 73. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 584 (2018). 
 74. For contrasting perspectives on the extent to which homeowners establish non-
reductive connections to their homes that are more pronounced than connections to other 
types of property, compare D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 255, 276–77 (2006) (“The literature on the psychology of home . . . show[s] that homes 
are sources of feelings of rootedness, continuity, stability, permanence, and connection to larger 
social networks.”), and Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 
960 (1982) (“Once we admit that a person can be bound up with an external ‘thing’ in some 
constitutive sense, we can argue that by virtue of this connection the person should be 
accorded broad liberty with respect to control over that ‘thing.’”), with Stephen Schnably, 
Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 Stan. 
L. Rev. 347, 364 (1993) (arguing that “people’s involvement with their homes is nowhere 
near as simple and uncontroversial as Radin’s presentation suggests”), and Stephanie M. 
Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 
1110 (2009) (arguing that “contrary to claims in the property scholarship, the home is not a 
primary construct of self and identity”). 
 75. Cf. Victoria A. Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionality of Protecting 
Tenants from Condominium Conversion, 18 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 179, 224–26 (1983) (dis-
tinguishing between owner occupancy interests and economic investment interests in property). 
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the community in which that property rests alive and functioning in a decent 
and just order.76 There undoubtedly are social contexts in which perspectives 
differ on whether an owner should be considered to have implicitly con-
sented to entry by nonowners. In adverse possession law, for instance, there 
is a jurisdictional split as to whether a nonowner’s occupation is presumed 
unpermitted by the titleholder when the parties are related to one 
another.77 But there also are, in the words of Joseph Singer, some real-
world minimum standards that we should be able to “take for granted” in 
a modern constitutional democracy.78 For example, there is general agree-
ment that there is no criminal trespass infraction when one enters a store 
because the fact that the owner presented the building as a store means 
that the property is open to the public.79 Similarly, unless homeowners put 
up signs in opposition to solicitation, they implicitly consent to nonowners 
knocking on their front doors to attempt to kickstart conversations on any 
number of issues, from political candidacies to the sale of cookies.80 The 
suggestion that people should be wary of entering a private home to which 
they have been invited seems wholly inconsistent with these norms; indeed, 
it calls into question the continuing viability of implicit consent in any con-
text at all. 
The unconvincing nature of the economic, privacy, and personal re-
sponsibility rationales suggests that a sparsely veiled pragmatic preference 
toward protecting local police departments from fiscally ruinous damage 
awards in civil rights cases most likely steered the Court to its conclusion.81 
Yet assuming that this interest is a legitimate one, it seems that several 
methods of serving that interest may have been available that did not in-
volve reallocating property rights in a manner that authorizes the police to 
arrest people in places where they reasonably trusted in others that they were 
                                                                                                                           
 76. See Lynda L. Butler, Property as a Management Institution, 82 Brook. L. Rev. 1215, 
1220–21 (2017) (critiquing conceptions of property that lack “an outward-regarding per-
spective that encompasses a broader sense of responsibility for the impacts of property use on 
society and nature, and that recognizes the role of collective action in managing the exercise of 
property rights”). 
 77. Compare Totman v. Malloy, 725 N.E.2d 1045, 1047–48 (Mass. 2000) (expressly 
declining to create a presumption that family membership between claimants to property 
renders prior use of that property permissive), with Petch v. Widger, 335 N.W.2d 254, 261 
(Neb. 1983) (“[A]s between parties sustaining parental and filial relationships, the posses-
sion of land of one by the other is presumed to be permissive, not adverse.”). 
 78. Joseph W. Singer, Things that We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum 
Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 Harv. L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 139, 150 (2008). 
 79. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Avila, Food Lion and Beyond: New Developments in the Law 
of Hidden Cameras, Comm. Law., Winter 1999, at 1, 21. 
 80. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145–49 (1943) (concluding that 
door-to-door canvassers’ speech interests and residents’ interests in receiving information 
outweigh community interests in preventing crime and protecting against annoyance). 
 81. The District’s appellate court had upheld a trial court judgment of $680,000 in 
compensatory damages, plus attorney’s fees. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 
577, 585 (2018). 
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permitted to be. For instance, the Court could have lowered the damage 
award or considered other remedies, such as an injunction, police train-
ing, or police discipline (including though not limited to suspension or sep-
aration of certain officers from the police force). Alternatively, it could have 
excused these specific officers from a suit for damages on qualified im-
munity grounds on the view that the statutory or constitutional unlawfulness 
of their conduct was not “clearly established at the time” they acted at the 
scene of this party.82 Such a course would have served the interest of pro-
tecting police departments from damage awards while treating neither set 
of actors—the attendees nor the police officers—as having done something 
wrong. Overturning the damages award on qualified immunity grounds 
would not critique the attendees for trusting that their inviters had authority 
to extend the party invitation; the Court would have had to conclude only 
that, in these “unique” circumstances,83 the police officers were not “plainly 
incompetent”84 or “knowingly violat[ing] the law”85 when making the arrests 
on the belief that the attendees were not telling the truth about their invita-
tions. A holding concentrating on immunity would have spared the Court 
from having to address the probable cause question—and, thus, the prop-
erty interest allocation question—at all.86 
C. Summary: Justifying Reallocation 
Post-Wesby, in those jurisdictions that subject to criminal trespass liability 
those persons who “knew or should have known” that their entry was un-
wanted by all lawful occupants, the recipient of what reasonably appears to 
be a valid social invitation has the option of (a) accepting the invitation only 
on proof of occupancy; (b) declining the invitation; or (c) accepting the in-
vitation without proof of occupancy at the risk of arrest, a risk that is shared 
disproportionately by marginalized communities. The economic, privacy, 
                                                                                                                           
 82. See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (“Qualified immunity shields 
government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or 
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”). 
 83. See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (recognizing that the “unique” facts 
and circumstances at hand indicated that the defendant officer’s conduct “did not violate clearly 
established law”). 
 84. See Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014). 
 85. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
 86. Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg each wrote separately to declare that they would 
have decided the case exclusively on these grounds. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 
S. Ct. 577, 593 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 
id. at 593–94 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment in part). Justice Thomas’s opinion for 
the Court addressed both the probable cause and qualified immunity issues. This Piece does 
not take a normative position on the substance of current Supreme Court doctrine surrounding 
qualified immunity but, instead, only notes that this doctrine provided a pathway for the 
Court to resolve Wesby in favor of the police in a manner that did not result in a de facto 
reallocation of property interests. For a concise recent summary of the scholarly commen-
tary on qualified immunity, see Crocker, supra note 8, at 1415–21. 
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personal responsibility, and pragmatic justifications for allowing these con-
sequences to persist are, when subjected to critical evaluation, wholly un-
persuasive. The decision denigrates what Rainer Forst calls the “basic right 
to justification” as to why we should operate under the assumption that other 
human beings are devious when they extend a social hand.87 
CONCLUSION: WESBY AND DISTRUST 
Property law and criminal law are more intertwined than an initial glance 
might suggest. Property, as a social institution, requires that the state make 
allocative choices in the face of competing access and exclusionary claims 
to finite resources. For crimes involving theft of, intrusion onto, or interfer-
ence with resources, these allocative choices establish the elements of the 
offense. Decades ago, the District of Columbia enacted a criminal trespass 
law that allocated property rights in the following manner: The general 
public held a right to access without fear of arrest those properties to which 
they reasonably believed they were welcome; in turn, titleholders held the 
correlative duty to respect reasonably mistaken access until the mistake is 
revealed.88 
In specifying the rights and duties of separate individuals who come into 
conflict with one another, this allocative choice helps to define the types of 
relationships that constitute us as necessarily intertwined social beings on 
equal terms.89 It assumes that people have the right to have guests, the right 
to be guests on the property of others, and the right to trust others when 
they lead us to believe that they have a property right to extend an invita-
tion. Requiring the state to demonstrate that entrants knew or should have 
known through some explicit or implicit objective manifestation that their 
entry was unwanted by all lawful occupants minimizes the risk that 
individuals would avoid availing themselves of associational opportunities 
out of fear that their conclusion that they are welcome onto another’s 
property, though reasonable under the circumstances, proves in error.90 
                                                                                                                           
 87. See Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of 
Justice 2 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2012). 
 88. Ortberg v. United States, 81 A.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining how earlier 
appellate court decisions had interpreted the District’s criminal trespass ordinance to require 
that the state produce evidence disproving entrants’ contentions that they “had a reasonable 
bona fide belief in [their] right to enter” to garner a conviction). 
 89. In Jennifer Nedelsky’s words, the liberal tradition of associating individualism with 
rights is “not so much wrong as seriously and dangerously one-sided in its emphasis.” Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 Rev. Const. Stud. 1, 13 (1993). 
 90. Drawing on John Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” reasoning, see John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice 136–42 (Harv. Univ. Press 2009) (1971), the District’s course reflects consideration of 
how one would want the criminal law to treat a nineteen-year-old child had the child attended 
a party on the good faith belief that the inviter had the authority to extend the invitation, when 
it ultimately turned out that this inviter had not yet formalized a lease, had overstayed a lease, 
or otherwise did not hold a sufficient interest in the property to host that party.  
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This Piece suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wesby oper-
ates to replace this right–duty pairing with a strengthened general right of 
titleholders to exclude others and the correlative duty of the public to avoid 
making even reasonable mistakes as to whether their invited entry onto an-
other’s property actually is warranted. The consequences of this de facto re-
allocation are not trivial. Post-Wesby, recipients of invitations face the choice 
of formally confirming their host’s occupancy rights, which breeds 
distrust; accepting invitations without such confirmation at the risk of 
arrest, which preys on vulnerabilities; or denying those invitations outright, 
which fosters social isolation. The economic, privacy, personal responsibility, 
and pragmatic rationales for withstanding these disturbing consequences—
which disproportionately will be borne by traditionally marginalized 
populations—are thin on their face and, in the final analysis, unconvincing. 
It will be incumbent on state and local governments to recognize the 
existence and impact of Wesby’s latent reallocation of property interests 
and, to the extent they are able within Wesby’s cramped confines, consider 
taking affirmative steps to reinstitute the prior allocation. 
If there is a silver lining to Wesby, it may lie in its signaling that trust is 
an oft-concealed but keenly important value with which we must engage 
when reflecting on the various options facing state entities as they decide 
how to allocate property interests. Indeed, when framed in their full 
complexity, there are a vast number of disputes over resources or interests 
from all corners of property law—including, for instance, rules on receiv-
ing stolen goods,91 disclosing hidden defects in residential sales,92 distrib-
uting assets upon divorce or separation,93 and acquiring land by adverse 
possession94 or estoppel95—in which one available choice allows a property 
claimant to violate trust that a competing claimant has placed in another 
person. Resolving these disputes, therefore, requires that the state decide 
whether it will establish an atmosphere that promotes trust or, in the 
pursuit of competing interests, one in which we must regularly question 
                                                                                                                           
 91. See, e.g., Jones v. Mitchell, 816 So. 2d 68, 72 (Ala. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing 
circumstances in which an innocent purchaser of stolen property may retain possession in the 
face of a claim by the person from whom the property had been stolen). 
 92. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985) (suggesting that a seller 
should not benefit from a sale reaped solely through failing to disclose a known defect not 
readily discoverable by the buyer, for allowing so would instruct sellers that they can disregard 
a buyer’s trust in entering the marketplace of residential sales in good faith). 
 93. See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313–15 (Wis. 1987) (recognizing the pos-
sibility of imposing a constructive trust on property accumulated throughout a relationship 
between unmarried partners to avoid unjust enrichment upon that relationship’s dissolution). 
 94. See, e.g., Reeves v. Metro. Tr. Co., 498 S.W.2d 2, 3–4 (Ark. 1973) (awarding owner-
ship of a parcel to claimants who possessed the parcel on the good faith—if mistaken—belief 
that they owned it, while declining to award ownership of a second parcel about which the 
claimants conceded they knew did not belong to them). 
 95. See, e.g., Burns v. McCormick, 135 N.E. 273, 273 (N.Y. 1922) (addressing a situa-
tion in which the claimants did not secure in writing prior to a family member’s passing the 
alleged promise from this family member that he would provide for them upon his death in 
exchange for their caring for him in his infirmity). 
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the motivations of others. In this sense, perhaps this Piece’s critical 
evaluation of Wesby can serve as the foundation point for future explora-
tions of the latent yet intimate connection between property—in and 
among all of its many forms—and trust. 
 
